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THE PROFESSION
The Credit Crunch  
and the Digital Bite
T he t it le of a recent article in The Guardian asked “Was software responsible for the 
financial crisis?” (www.guardian.
co.uk /technology/2008/oct /16/ 
computing-sof tware-f inancia l-
crisis), although the first sentence 
more properly blamed “the analysts 
who built the computer software 
that drove the derivatives markets 
that, in turn, drove the financial 
collapse.” Although these ana-
lysts—quantitative analysts or 
quants for short—are mostly physi-
cists or mathematicians rather than 
computing professionals, the credit 
crunch has many implications for 
our profession.
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
Banks and other financial insti-
tutions work by transferring and 
otherwise manipulating money. 
The modern f inancia l systems 
used by the employers of quants 
harness modern digital technol-
ogy to work with money of various 
kinds, and in increasingly diverse 
ways. The Internet makes it easy 
for money of different kinds to be 
bought and sold, to be sent and 
received, and to be amplified and 
hidden away.
In the early days of automatic data 
processing, banks and insurance com-
panies were important users of digital 
machinery. The banking industry put 
an enormous effort into developing 
the automatic machinery for process-
ing checks that had data encoded in 
the familiar MICR fashion, now half a 
century old. This fostered the growth 
of commercial banking, and was fol-
lowed by other financial machinery 
and processes now familiar in initial-
isms such as ATM and EFTPOS.
The rise of finance
At the same time, other financial 
enterprises have exploited digital 
technology in various ways and have 
flourished through this use. In the 
US, the financial industry’s share of 
the stock market had risen to nearly 
a quarter in 2007, up from a twentieth 
in 1980. It would be reasonable to say 
that this was only possible through 
use of modern digital technology.
International currency trading is 
another area where digital technol-
ogy has played a huge role, with a 
huge market both black and white. If 
the tax on such trading suggested as 
a control measure by US economist 
James Tobin in 1978 were set at one 
basis point (jargon for one hundredth 
of a percent), the revenue would be 
around $70 billion a year (www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/
oct/15/economics-economy).
Digital technology has allowed 
money to be dealt with automatically 
and swiftly in amounts both huge and 
small. This dealing is simply data pro-
cessing because money nowadays is 
simply digital data.
Data processing at the private level 
lets people more conveniently buy 
goods and services; at the retail and 
wholesale enterprise level it allows 
more convenient selling and buying 
of goods and services; and at the 
production and manufacturing level 
it allows more convenient selling of 
goods and services. 
Unhitched from reality
Beyond these levels, financial data 
processing permits transactions that 
have nothing to do with goods, little to 
do with services, and can be carried 
out blindingly fast with any amount 
of money. The financial industry’s 
growth has come about through the 
proliferation of the financial pro-
cesses and instruments made possible 
by modern digital technology.
Much of the talk about repairing 
the failing financial system has con-
centrated on forbidding or limiting 
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certain kinds of financial transac-
tions. For example, the Tobin tax, 
originally suggested to smooth out 
exchange-rate fluctuations, has been 
put forward as a means of exposing 
or preventing the use of tax havens 
and other means of camouflaging 
money. The problem with seeking 
to control processes is that it’s quite 
easy for quants and their ilk to work 
out new processes, which leaves the 
would-be controllers always chasing 
a moving target.
A SHORT HISTORY  
OF MONEY
What is being processed is 
money. To understand the credit 
crunch we must understand what 
money has become and how.
Better than barter
Money originally had to with avoid-
ing the inconvenience of bartering 
goods. Setting up some intermediary 
goods—such as cowrie shells—with 
inherent numerality let goods be 
given or taken amicably by exchang-
ing them for an agreed quantity of the 
intermediary.
Developing civilizations enjoyed 
a clear advantage in having this 
intermediary be durable, portable, 
and valuable in its own right. In Asia 
Minor over two millennia ago this 
led to coins being made out of gold 
and silver, valuable metals that were 
both durable and, given their density, 
portable. The numerality was credibly 
achieved by having the coins officially 
issued with a stamped inscription 
identifying their weight.
The convenience of coinage meant 
it was widely adopted. For example, 
about a millennium ago in England, 
William the Conqueror issued silver 
pennies weighing one-240th of a 
pound. Until recently, countries using 
the pound as their basic unit of cur-
rency still maintained 240 pennies to 
the pound.
Heavy metal?
Coinage’s usefulness depends on 
the maintenance of its perceived 
value. In William’s time, and for a 
century or two after, monetary trans-
actions were fairly limited, so there 
was no depreciation. By Elizabeth I’s 
time, however, 240 pennies held only 
a quarter of a pound of silver, which 
brought England into disfavor with 
other countries. This official deprecia-
tion is called debasement.
As the use of coins increased, so 
did fraud of various kinds. The wear 
and tear of frequent use made it 
possible to remove metal inconspicu-
ously. New coins therefore had more 
inherent value than old, so they were 
from time to time officially debased to 
prevent new coins from being melted 
down. Elizabeth brought this process 
to a halt by a complete recoinage in 
1560–1561 and, apart from one quite 
minor case, there was no debasement 
until 1931.
This is just a glimpse of coinage’s 
early history. There were many com-
plications and vicissitudes, such as 
the varying use of gold and silver in 
different countries, the varying avail-
ability of gold and silver bullion, and 
political activities such as conducting 
wars and their financing.
However, there is more to money 
than coins. Their increasing use 
meant not only that more people 
used them, but also that transac-
tions needed more and more coins. 
Banks overcame this inconvenience 
by holding coins or bullion safely for 
depositors, who were issued with 
bank notes that recorded their entitle-
ment to their deposits.
Duly noted
The establishment of banks led to 
traffic in bank notes. Depositors could 
pay debts using their bank notes, and 
the banks could use those notes in 
reverse to lend money on the basis 
of their having coinage on deposit 
sufficient for the day-to-day needs of 
both depositors and borrowers. In this 
way, the amount of money in circula-
tion was no longer directly tied to the 
amount of bullion on deposit, but to 
the total of the bank notes on issue. 
This decoupling could and did badly 
affect prices.
Governments mainly avoided 
these bad effects by limiting the 
issue of notes so that the potential 
for converting a bank note into bul-
lion was preserved. The two political 
controls involved—on convertibility 
and on the issue of notes—were vari-
ously applied and typically reapplied 
after relaxation led to depression and 
depreciation.
Forced conversion
A fur ther complicat ion was 
the rise of international transac-
t ions that required conversion 
of money from one currency to 
another. Such conversion prob-
lems led to the internat iona l 
Bretton Woods agreement at the 
end of World War II. This linked 
international exchange rates to 
the US dollar, which was convert-
ible to gold (news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/7725157.stm).
All this changed in August 1971 
when the US suspended the dol-
lar’s convertibility, freeing the 
dollar from its direct guarantee of 
real value. The US dollar being the 
world’s dominant currency, this 
led to floating exchange rates and 
a huge international flow of money 
because the perception of its value 
now inevitably fluctuated. Govern-
ments had to concern themselves 
with adjusting to the effects of huge 
amounts of money moving around 
and changing what was seen as their 
intrinsic value.
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To understand the credit crunch we must understand 
what money has become and how.
Monetary explosion
The financial industries were now 
able to devise a succession of mone-
tary instruments and procedures that 
vastly expanded their enterprises 
(www.economist.com/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=12415730). Currency 
futures trading started in 1972 and 
grew rapidly, followed by options 
trading, arbitrage, securitization, 
interest-rate swaps, portfolio insur-
ance, collateralized debt and, in the 
past decade, credit-default swaps. By 
and large, regulation was reduced, 
starting with the abolition of capital 
controls and the separation of com-
mercial and investment banking.
Changes of these kinds were accel-
erated by the use of digital technology, 
recently achieving breakneck speed. 
“Somehow the genius quants—the 
best and brightest geeks Wall Street 
firms could buy—fed $1 trillion 
in subprime mortgage debt into 
their supercomputers, added some 
derivatives, massaged the arrange-
ments with computer algorithms 
and—poof!—created $62 trillion in 
imaginary wealth” (www.nytimes.
com/2008/10/12/opinion/12dooling.
html?_r=1&th&emc=th). This descrip-
tion is a somewhat hyperbolic account 
of what actually happened.
More soberly: “The total outstand-
ing notional amount of financial 
derivatives, according to the Bank for 
International Settlements, is $684 tril-
lion (as of June 2008)—over 12 times 
the world’s nominal gross domestic 
product.” (sec.online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB122663373660027575.html). 
Spread worldwide, that’s roughly 
$100,000 per capita. How unreal can 
money get?
RUNAWAY COMPLEXITY
Given that it’s impractical to con-
trol the development of abstract 
processes and that quants can easily 
stay one lap ahead of the control-
lers, how is the world of money to 
be tamed? Money itself must be 
better controlled. Clearly, money has 
become far too complex by disen-
gaging from real value—goods and 
goods-related services.
Fixed or stable exchange rates 
would bring some reality back to 
money, primarily in the international 
arena. However this only addresses 
relative values, and doesn’t address 
the problem of setting up a direct 
representation of real value. Simply 
reverting to some form of a gold stan-
dard would do this, but it would be 
politically and practically impossible 
except maybe in stages. What might 
be a first stage?
In an earlier essay I suggested 
a way to reduce the complexity of 
corporate structures (The Profes-
sion, July 2003, pp. 100, 98-99). The 
idea was to forbid “any corporation 
from owning part of any corporation 
that owns part of any other corpora-
tion—or, more succinctly, [to limit] 
corporate ownership to two levels.”
While adopting this simplification 
would tend also to simplify finan-
cial systems, the idea could also be 
applied to money. This would forbid 
money or other financial instruments 
from being applied to any financial 
instrument that doesn’t directly rep-
resent real value, a modern version 
of placing limits on bank note issue. 
More succinctly, financial structures 
would be limited to two levels. This 
would eliminate the derivatives that 
are the credit crunch’s root cause.
The computing profession will all too likely be blamed for the bad results of any 
complex project involving comput-
ers. This has already happened with 
the present financial crisis, as the 
opening citation notes.
Two principles should be kept in 
mind. First, any computing system 
will fail in the long run if the real-
life system it supports is flawed in 
the first place. According to an old 
saying, you mustn’t mechanize a 
mess because all you’ll get is a bigger 
faster mess. The financial crisis is just 
such a creature.
Second, in complex projects the 
computing professional should be 
working in partnership with mem-
bers of other relevant professions 
(The Profession, Jan. 2007, pp. 128, 
126-127). Complex projects require 
knowledge and experience beyond 
that likely to be held by a computing 
professional, and so responsibility 
should be shared.
In the present crucial situation 
the computing profession must work 
in partnership with the other profes-
sions bringing digital technology to 
bear on the problem. More impor-
tantly, the profession must exercise 
system engineering skill and pro-
fessional influence to ensure that 
the problem being faced is properly 
understood by all involved in solv-
ing it. 
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